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Whether a person who is injured because of an unsafe sidewalk is 
able to recover damages from an abutting property owner remains open 
to question as a result of the vagaries of current New Jersey law. 
Sidewalk liability law contains subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions and 
exceptions creating uncertainty about whether and under what 
circumstances an abutting property owner will be liable for injury 
caused by an unsafe condition on the sidewalk. This lack of clarity has 
led to an unwieldy hodge-podge of rules and exceptions that, in the 
interest of fairness, uniformity and predictability should be replaced by 
a uniform standard irrespective of the status of the property owner or 
the nature of the unsafe condition. 
This Article reviews the current state of sidewalk liability law in 
New Jersey, which sets different standards of liability depending upon 
whether the abutting property is owned by a private individual or a 
public entity and, if private, whether the use of the abutting property is 
commercial, residential, public or charitable. Further, this Article 
examines the rationale for imposing different standards. Ultimately, it 
determines that the public policy rationale for the different standards 
does not withstand scrutiny. This Article recommends, therefore, 
imposing a duty and consequent liability only when affirmative conduct 
of an abutting property owner causes or contributes to the unsafe 
condition on the sidewalk. 
I. EVOLUTION OF SIDEWALK LIABILITY LAW IN NEW 
JERSEY 
A.   The Common Law Rule: No Liability Absent Affirmative 
Conduct of Abutting Property Owner 
Under the common law in New Jersey, an abutting property owner 
had no liability for the condition of a public sidewalk.
1
 Exceptions to 
this rule abounded, however, and an abutting property owner would be 
held liable for creating an unsafe condition or undertaking an obligation 
to repair or maintain the sidewalk but doing so negligently.
2
 Prior to the 
seminal New Jersey Supreme Court case of Stewart v. 104 Wallace 
 
1 See, e.g., Yanhko v. Fane, 362 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1976). 
2 See, e.g., Ford v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 166 A. 490, 490-91 (N.J. 1933); 
Lambe v. Reardon, 173 A.2d 520, 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961), certif. denied, 174 
A.2d 924 (N.J. 1961). 
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Street, Incorporated,
3
 an abutting property owner generally was not 
liable for the condition of a public sidewalk absent “negligent 
construction or repair of the sidewalk by himself or by a specified 
predecessor in title or for direct use or obstruction of the sidewalk by 
the owner in such a manner as to render it unsafe for passersby.”
4
 
The predictable application of this rule was apparent in case law. 
An example is provided in Murray v. Michalak, where the root of a tree 
elevated a defendant’s flagstone sidewalk.
5
 While walking along the 
sidewalk the plaintiff tripped over a raised slab and fell, sustaining 
injuries.
6
 The court found that the plaintiff had the burden of proving 
that defendants or their predecessors in title planted the tree, thus 
creating the nuisance.
7
 Because there was no proof the defendant or his 
predecessor in title planted the tree, the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division (Appellate Division) held summary judgment should 
have been entered on their behalf.
8
 Likewise, in Lambe v. Reardon, the 
plaintiff tripped over a raised flagstone slab and fell, suffering personal 
injuries in front of the defendants’ property.
9
 The court remanded for a 
new trial to determine whether the defendants had in fact installed a 
drain under the flagstone as alleged by the plaintiff.
10
 The court 
determined that the lifting and replacement of the slab might have been 
attributable to the owner of the property at the time the installation was 
made, but the determination of defendant’s liability was an issue of fact 
for the jury.
11
 The requirement that an abutting property owner engage 
in some affirmative conduct before liability could attach culminated in 
 
3 Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981). 
4 Yanhko, 362 A.2d at 3. See, e.g., Abraham v. Gupta, 656 A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 663 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1995) (based on Yanhko rule, owner 
of vacant lot owed no duty to plaintiff who fell on snow on abutting public sidewalk); 
MacGrath v. Levin Prop., 606 A.2d 1108, 1109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), certif. 
denied, 611 A.2d 656 (N.J. 1992) (applying Yanhko rule in holding a shopping center owner 
owed no duty to plaintiff to provide a safe means of passage across the adjoining public 
highway); Levin v. Devoe, 533 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (applying 
Yanhko rule in holding owner owed no duty to plaintiff who tripped on curb in front of 
owner’s apartment building). 
5 Murray v. Michalak, 276 A.2d 866, 867 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. Nuisance is defined as something that interferes with the use of property by being 
irritating, offensive, obstructive or dangerous. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
8 Murray, 276 A.2d at 868. 
9 Lambe v. Reardon, 173 A.2d 520, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). 
10 Id. at 527. 
11 Id. at 526. 
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the seminal case of Yanhko v. Fane, in which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court concluded it would be arbitrary to impose a tort duty of care upon 
a property owner simply because the property abuts a sidewalk that is 
part of the public domain.
12
 
The common law rule was fair, uniform and predictable. Property 
owners did not have to concern themselves with an affirmative 
obligation to maintain an adjacent public sidewalk as long as they did 
not contribute to a defective condition or voluntarily undertake to make 
a repair and then do so negligently. Liability was properly placed on the 
party whose affirmative acts caused or contributed to the defect. This 
fair, just and predictable rule, however, would soon be jettisoned by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court as to commercial property owners. 
B. Duty to Maintain Imposed on Commercial Property Owners 
In 1981, a mere five years after the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Yanhko pronounced it would be “arbitrary” to impose a duty of 
maintenance on an owner of property abutting a sidewalk, the Court did 
an about-face and imposed a duty on commercial property owners. In a 
clear break from precedent, the Court held in Stewart that commercial 
property owners are responsible for maintaining sidewalks abutting 
their property.
13
 This revision of the common law rule was the first step 
in diluting the classic rule of no liability absent affirmative conduct. 
After Stewart, mere proximity to a sidewalk made commercial property 
owners liable for abutting pieces of public property. 
The Stewart majority based its decision on a fairness rationale. The 
Court reasoned that commercial property owners “retain considerable 
interests in and rights to use [abutting] sidewalks over and above those 
of the public – a fact which renders imposition of the duty of 
maintenance upon them appropriate and not ‘arbitrary’”; further, it held 
that such owners “are in an ideal position to inspect [these] sidewalks 
and to take prompt action to cure defects.”
14
 The duty imposed on 
owners of commercial property abutting a sidewalk is not limited to 
artificial conditions, like surface defects, cracks and holes. It also 
applies to natural conditions, like snow and ice accumulation. The same 
theory applies in both situations: abutting commercial property owners 
retain considerable interest in the adjoining sidewalk and are well 
 
12 Yanhko v. Fane, 362 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1976). 
13 Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 887 (N.J. 1981). 
14 Id. at 887-88. 
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positioned to inspect and maintain it regularly.
15
 
In order to justify this about-face, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reviewed the development of sidewalk liability law focusing on the 
utility of sidewalks to support the imposition of liability on abutting 
commercial property owners. The Court noted: “[c]onsistent with their 
function, it has long been the law of this State that ‘[a] sidewalk is 
intended primarily for pedestrians’ and that ‘the primary function of the 
sidewalk [is] the public’s right to travel on it.’”
16
 The Court further 
stated, “[a]s a consequence of this primary right of the public to use the 
sidewalk . . . any act or obstruction that unnecessarily incommodes or 
impedes its lawful use by the public is a nuisance.”
17
 The Court justified 
its reasoning by observing that the public “has the right to assume that 
there is no dangerous impediment or pitfall. . . .”
18
 Although an abutting 
property owner has considerable interest in and right to use the 
sidewalk, that right is subject to the “public’s paramount easement of 
unobstructed use.”
19
 
The underlying rationale for imposition of liability focuses on “the 
benefits of sidewalks to abutting commercial owners,” and the fact that 
such a rule “would serve the dual purpose of providing recourse to 
innocent pedestrians and an incentive to abutting commercial owners to 
keep their sidewalks in good repair.”
20
 In imposing a duty upon abutting 
commercial property owners, the Court assumed benefits to the 
business, specifically ease of access to and from their establishments by 
the pedestrian public who have a right “to safe and unimpeded passage 
along the sidewalk.”
21
 
In Abraham v. Gupta, the Appellate Division held there was no 
legal basis for sidewalk liability because the property was vacant and no 
business operations or activities were being conducted at the property at 
the time of the accident.
22
 The Appellate Division reasoned that because 
 
15 See Mirza v. Fillmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 1983). 
16 Stewart, 432 A.2d at 884 (quoting Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 53 (N.J. 1975) 
(citations omitted)). 
17 Id. at 884 (quoting Saco v. Hall, 63 A.2d 887, 889 (N.J. 1949)). 
18 Id. (quoting Saco, 63 A.2d at 889). 
19 Id. 
20 Nielsen v. Borough of Metuchen, 810 A.2d 600, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(citing Stewart, 432 A.2d at 884).   
21 Stewart, 432 A.2d at 884. 
22 Abraham v. Gupta, 656 A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), certif. 
denied, 663 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1995). 
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the property (1) was not owned by or used as part of a contiguous 
commercial enterprise or business; (2) did not entertain a daily business 
activity on the lot to which safe and convenient access was essential; 
and (3) had no means of generating income to purchase liability 
insurance or to spread the risk of loss, there was no benefit to the 
property owner justifying imposition of liability for accidents resulting 
from an unsafe sidewalk.
23
 
Reflecting the difficult task of line drawing resulting from the 
Stewart rule, the Appellate Division in Gray v. Caldwell Wood 
Products, Incorporated, reversed the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the owner of a vacant commercial building defendant where the 
trial court, in reliance on Abraham, concluded that the defendant’s 
commercial property was not subject to sidewalk liability because, as a 
vacant building, the property was not being used at the time of the 
accident.
24
 In granting summary judgment, the trial court reasoned: 
There has to be a-a business enterprise being conducted on the 
property, whether it’s vacant or not, to have the capacity to generate 
income. Whether they’re profitable or not doesn’t matter. Once you 
have an enterprise being conducted from a property under Stewart, 
and as articulated in Abraham v. Gupta, you are subject to sidewalk 
liability. 
. . . . 
Where there is no use of the property, there can be no liability. So 
summary judgment is being awarded . . . .
25
 
The Appellate Division disagreed and reversed the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the owner holding that a vacant 
commercial building is unlike a vacant commercial lot at issue because 
“[t]he vacant property could have been put to use to generate income as 
a retail store” and the defendant made the property accessible to 
potential buyers, maintained property insurance and “sold the property 
to make money.”
26
 None of these details make commercial property all 
that unlike non-commercial property, however, and every property 
might be put to a use that generates income. 
Thus, the Stewart rationale that the benefit a sidewalk provides to 
an abutting property owner is a sufficient rationale to impose liability on 
 
23 Id. 
24 Gray v. Caldwell Wood Prod., Inc., No. A-0120-11T1, 2012 WL 1569785, at *1 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 7, 2012). 
25 Id. at *1-2.  
26 Id. at *3. 
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an adjoining property owner justifies imposing liability for unsafe 
conditions can be applied to non-commercial property owners as well. 
Indeed, Gray appears to extend the Stewart holding to property that 
“could have been put to use to generate income” and may extend 
liability beyond that anticipated by Stewart.
27
 In determining whether a 
use is commercial enough to justify imposition of liability on the 
adjoining property owner,  courts have focused on the activities of the 
property owner and have engaged in a pigeon-holing of uses that has 
unduly complicated sidewalk liability law. 
II. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF NON-COMMERCIAL 
SIDEWALK LIABILITY IN NEW JERSEY 
Beyond categorizing a property owner as commercial or non-
commercial, non-commercial uses are further segregated into one of 
four subcategories. Those subcategories are residential, 
religious/charitable, public, and mixed-use. The classification of non-
commercial property is crucial to a plaintiff’s case against a property 
owner, as different precedent and legal standards govern each 
subcategory, adding to the lack of fairness, uniformity and predictability 
in the law. 
A.  Residential 
Residential homeowners generally have no duty to maintain 
sidewalks abutting their property absent an affirmative act that caused 
or contributed to the unsafe condition. Thus, the common law rule 
imposed a duty when the property owner “negligently constructed or 
repaired the sidewalk or used it in a way that rendered it unsafe.”
28
 
“[T]he owner[] in making such use of the way is required to do so by a 
method of construction as not to create a nuisance but having done so is 
under a further duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the structure 
safe for the use of the public.”
29
 If the defect was caused by an 
affirmative act of a predecessor in title, a duty may be imposed on the 
current owner and the predecessor in title even after the property has 
 
27 Id. 
28 Guerriero v. Palmer, 417 A.2d 547, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (citing 
Yanhko v. Fane, 362 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1976). 
29 Young v. Nat’l Bank of N.J., 191 A. 848, 848-49 (N.J. 1937). See also Hayden v. 
Curly, 169 A.2d 809, 812 (N.J. 1961); NJ MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES § 5.20B(B)(3) 
(2009). 
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been conveyed.
30
 
Bierylo v. Santos provides a good illustration of this rule.
31
 
Plaintiffs Florence and Michael Bierylo appealed from a summary 
judgment order dismissing their complaint arising out of injuries 
sustained by Florence.
32
 Florence fell on an upraised portion of the 
public sidewalk abutting property owned by defendants Angel and 
Maria Santos.
33
 Sometime after they purchased their property, the Town 
of Kearny planted a tree on the grassy strip between the sidewalk and 
the curb.
34
 Over time the roots of the tree extended under the sidewalk 
and caused one or more of the sidewalk slabs to rise up creating a one 
inch height differential between the adjacent slabs.
35
 While walking on 
the sidewalk, the plaintiff tripped and sustained significant injuries.
36
 
According to the plaintiff’s expert, “the raised slab constituted a 
tripping hazard in violation of applicable standards.”
37
 The court noted 
that it seemed clear the defendants knew or should have known of the 
uneven condition of the sidewalk caused by the tree roots.
38
 Mr. Santos 
testified, however, that he did not plant the tree, performed no 
maintenance on the tree and “had never made any repairs to the 
sidewalk until immediately following the accident.”
39
 
The court held that because the town planted the tree, the 
defendants were not responsible for its placement, care or 
maintenance.
40
 The court noted further that, although the entire area of 
law has become a “continuing saga”
41
 without “any current justification 
for the rule insulating owners of purely residential property from 
liability for”
42
 the common problem of raised sidewalks, it considered 
itself bound by Yanhko.
43
 It went on to note that the matter continues to 
 
30 Cogliati v. Ecco High Frequency Corp., 456 A.2d 524, 526-27, 530 (N.J. 1983). 
31 Bierylo v. Santos, No. A-1873-05T2, 2006 WL 2052061, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 25, 2006). 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Bierylo, 2006 WL 2052061, at *2. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. at *10. 
41 Id. (citing Smith v. Young, 692 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)). 
42 Id. (citing Smith, 692 A.2d at 100 (Brochin, J., dissenting)). 
43 Bierylo, 2006 WL 2052061, at *10.  
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be ripe for re-evaluation.
44
 The court concluded by commenting that 
sidewalk liability law continues to “represent a legal albatross” of the 
judicial system,
45
 which, despite the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
invitation over twenty-five years ago in Stewart,
46
 had not been 
addressed by the New Jersey Legislature. 
As to natural accumulations of snow and ice, residential 
homeowners have no duty to inspect and maintain an abutting sidewalk. 
Municipal ordinances that impose a duty on homeowners to maintain 
the sidewalks abutting their homes have been held not to provide a 
private right of action for violations of such ordinances.
47
 The only 
penalty for violation of such a municipal ordinance is to pay the penalty 
prescribed by the ordinance.
48
 
B. Religious/Charitable 
While the law generally protects religious and charitable entities 
through the Charitable Immunity Act, New Jersey courts have imposed 
liability on religious and charitable organizations, including churches 
and schools, for accidents on abutting sidewalks when they engage in 
business-like activity.
49
 For instance, in Christmas v. City of Newark, a 
pedestrian injured on a sidewalk sought to recover from the City of 
Newark for her injuries.
50
 The offending sidewalk abutted property 
“owned by trustees of the First Presbyterian Church” and was leased to 
a doughnut shop.
51
 The court overturned a jury verdict rendered against 
the City, concluding that the abutting property owner, the First 
 
44 Id. at *11 (citing Yanhko v. Fane, 362 A.2d 1, 6-13 (N.J. 1976) (Pashman, J., 
dissenting)).   
45 Id. (quoting Yanhko, 362 A.2d at 6 (Pashman, J., dissenting)).   
46 “We note, however, that the law of sidewalk liability is an appropriate subject for 
reconsideration by the Legislature.” Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 889 n.6 
(N.J. 1981). 
47 Bierylo, 2006 WL 2052061, at *6-7. This rule has been a part of the common law for 
decades. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Sewall v. Fox that “‘[o]rdinances 
requiring persons to keep their sidewalks free from ice impose a purely public duty, and 
persons injured by slipping on the ice cannot bring private action against the owners of the 
premises.’” Sewall v. Fox, 98 N.J.L. 819, 821 (1923); see also Brown v. Saint Venantius 
Sch., 544 A.2d 842, 847 (N.J. 1988). 
48 Sewall, 98 N.J.L. at 822; see also Liptak v. Frank, 502 A.2d 1147, 1149 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1985). 
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2000). 
50 Christmas v. City of Newark, 523 A.2d 1094, 1095 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. 
denied, 528 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1987). 
51 Id. 
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Presbyterian Church, and its tenant were the responsible parties.
52
 The 
court determined that in leasing a portion of their property to a 
doughnut shop, the church should be held liable as a commercial 
property owner. Finding that “the Stewart court’s holding 
unambiguously states that commercial property owners, not the 
municipality, owe a duty to pedestrians to maintain sidewalks which 
abut their property,”
53
 the court held that the church, not the city, was 
responsible for maintaining the sidewalk abutting the doughnut shop.
54
 
Likewise, in Brown v. Saint Venantius School, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court considered whether a school that was part of church 
organized as a religious corporation pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. 
sections 16:15-1 to -8 could be considered a commercial enterprise for 
purposes of Stewart liability:
55
 
Undeniably, a for-profit private school, not connected with any 
charity, charging tuition and operated in all other respects 
substantially like defendant, would be deemed, under Stewart and 
Mirza, a commercial landowner for purposes of sidewalk liability. 
Despite its similarity to such a clear case, defendant St. Venantius 
School asserts that because it is a nonprofit religious institution, it 
cannot be classified a “commercial” landowner under Stewart. We 
disagree.
56
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the point of 
inquiry is the nature of the activities in which the charitable 
organization is engaged: 
Balancing these interests in cases such as the one before us requires 
first that we consider the use of the abutting land, not the nature of 
the organization that owns the property. For example, if a church 
owned an abutting property used for a restaurant or hotel, the church 
in that instance would clearly be a commercial landowner . . . 
Conversely, the sidewalk in front of a parsonage or rectory abuts 
residential property. Thus, we reject the notion that religious 
organizations per se cannot be commercial landowners for purposes 
of sidewalk liability.
57
 
Questionable assumptions and unsupported notions of fairness that 
 
52 Id. at 1099. 
53 Id. at 1098-99. 
54 Id. at 1099. 
55 Brown v. Saint Venantius Sch., 544 A.2d 842, 843 (N.J. 1988). 
56 Id. at 846. 
57 Id.  
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led the Court to impose a duty on commercial property owners to 
inspect and maintain an adjacent sidewalk seem inconsistent and even 
more inequitable when applied to a nonprofit charitable institution such 
as Saint Venantius School. The inequity resulting from the Court’s 
analysis demonstrates the lack of principled rationale. For instance, if 
one is in front of a church heading for services and falls on the adjacent 
sidewalk, the church is immune from liability as a charitable 
organization.
58
 If the same person is walking a child to the adjacent for 
profit school on property owned by the church, however, the church will 
be held to the greater duty of care standard of commercial property 
owners and will be held liable for failing to discover and make safe an 
unsafe condition. This demonstrates the Stewart rule’s unfairness and 
lack of uniformity and predictability. Even if one were to argue that a 
for-profit commercial property owner should be held liable on the 
theory that the for-profit commercial property owner gets more use out 
of the sidewalk and the sidewalk increases the profitability of the 
business due to ease of access, the same theory does not apply to 
nonprofit commercial institutions like Saint Venantius School. The 
Church made no money on the operation of the school and provided the 
school as a service to the community. Under the Stewart rule, the school 
is a major liability for the Church. A for-profit commercial property 
owner may be able to pass on to its customers the cost of sidewalk 
maintenance, repairs and legal liability as a cost of doing business, but 
nonprofit commercial property owners, in many cases, do not have that 
luxury. The Stewart rule, initially inspired by a sense that it advanced 
the public interest, may, in fact, dissuade charitable and religious 
entities from engaging in activities that benefit the community because 
of a concern that by doing so, they are increasing their exposure to 
liability. 
In Restivo v. Church of Saint Joseph of the Palisades the court 
reached a similar unprincipled result. There, a church was held liable for 
injuries sustained on a sidewalk in front of a church-owned building, 
 
58 The New Jersey Legislature has mandated that the Charitable Immunity Act shall be 
construed liberally to afford immunity “in furtherance of the public policy for the protection 
of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, 
educational or hospital purposes.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-10 (West 2000); Hardwicke v. 
Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900, 918-19 (N.J. 2006). To successfully obtain Charitable 
Immunity, an entity must be: (1) formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) organized exclusively 
for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) promoting such purposes at the 
time of plaintiff’s injury who was then a beneficiary of the entity’s charitable works. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2000).  
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leased in part to a nonprofit community organization that ran a Head 
Start community action program on the premises.
59
 The rest of the 
building was residential and all of the tenants were paying either below-
market rents or no rent at all.
60
 The fact that the church made no profit 
through the ownership of this building and that use of the property by 
the Head Start program and low-income tenants advanced the charitable 
works of the church, was essentially ignored by the Appellate Division, 
which considered the church to be engaged in commercial activity and 
therefore subject to liability.
61
 For the Restivo court, the use of the 
property for rental purposes was commercial even though it rented to 
Head Start for less than market value.
62
 Furthermore, the fact that it 
leased the other part of the property to tenants who lived in apartments, 
also at a below-market rate, was of no consequence for the court.
63
 The 
benefit a sidewalk provides to an abutting commercial property owner 
that led the New Jersey Supreme Court to consider it fair to impose an 
obligation to inspect and make safe the sidewalk seems entirely 
inapplicable to a church providing subsidized housing to the poor and a 
Head Start program for inner city children and such application of the 
Stewart rule is misguided. 
Conversely, a church used only for non-commercial activity is not 
subject to liability for injuries resulting from defects on an abutting 
sidewalk. In Dupree v. City of Clifton, the plaintiff fell while walking 
south along the uneven public sidewalk bordering the Netherlands 
Reformed Church’s property.
64
 The sidewalk’s uneven condition was 
caused by a tree with roots running underneath.
65
 The plaintiff’s foot 
caught the raised edge of the sidewalk, causing her to trip and tumble 
toward the tree, smashing her hand and wrist into the tree trunk and 
sustaining injury.
66
 The church was a nonprofit corporation created solely 
for religious and charitable purposes; none of its property was rented or 
otherwise used for any other purpose.
67
 The parties also discovered that 
 
59 Restivo v. Church of Saint Joseph of the Palisades, 703 A.2d 997, 998 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1004. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1003. 
64 Dupree v. City of Clifton, 798 A.2d 105, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 106-07. 
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the Church constructed the sidewalk about forty years before plaintiff’s 
fall, and repaired a portion of the sidewalk eight or ten years prior to the 
accident.
68
 
Plaintiff hired a consulting engineer who concluded that the 
sidewalk was negligently maintained.
69
 His inspection revealed that the 
roots of the tree lifted the sidewalk abutting the Church’s property two 
and one-quarter inches.
70
 Plaintiff’s claim rested on his belief that 
“‘persons responsible for the maintenance of [the] sidewalk should have 
performed regular inspections of the premises to assure that such 
defects did not remain over long periods of time since their occurrence 
is so common.’”
71
 
The court held that the Church was a nonprofit corporation 
“created solely for religious, charitable and educational purposes.”
72
 
There was no evidence that it engaged “in any commercial or business-
like activity.”
73
 As such, the court held the Church did not have a duty to 
maintain the sidewalk because it was a non-commercial property 
owner.
74
 
In Dupree the church-defendant did not operate a school, day-care 
center or other so-called commercial service that would have exposed it 
to liability as in Brown and Restivo. The irony is palpable – a religious 
or charitable entity that does not partner with other entities to provide 
needed services to the community will not face liability while one that 
does will be liable. The Stewart rule’s blind adherence to the 
commercial nature of activities conducted on the abutting premise 
without considering the lack of profit and the undeniable public benefit 
leads to anomalous results. The lack of fairness, uniformity and 
predictability of the Stewart rule may result in churches and other 
nonprofit institutions shuttering their “commercial” yet socially 
beneficial works for fear of the liability imposed upon these so-called 
commercial enterprises. 
 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 107. 
70 Dupree, 798 A.2d at 107. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 111. 
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C. Public 
Public entities have an entirely different duty regarding sidewalks. 
The Tort Claims Act
75
 (Act) provides that “a public entity is not liable 
for an injury”
76
 caused by an act or omission “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by this Act.”
77
 Further highlighting the lack of uniformity in 
this area of law, “immunity is the rule and liability is the exception” 
under the Act.
78
 The exception to the general rule of immunity relevant 
to sidewalk liability is found in N.J. STAT. ANN. section 59:4-2, which 
covers dangerous conditions on public property. That statute provides: 
A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its 
property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous 
condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately 
caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created 
a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, 
and that either: 
a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public 
entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous 
condition; or 
 
a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to 
have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a 
public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the 
action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to 
take such action was not palpably unreasonable.
79
 
The Act defines “public property” as property that is “owned or 
controlled by the public entity.”
80
 A “‘[d]angerous condition’ means a 
condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such 
property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that it will be used.”
81
 By the explicit terms of the Act, a 
public entity can be liable for dangerous conditions of property it does 
not own, as long as the public entity “controls” the dangerous property, 
 
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to -12-3 (West 2006). 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1. 
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-1. 
78 Posey ex rel. Posey v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 793 A.2d 607, 613 (N.J. 2002). 
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2. 
80 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-1(c). 
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-1(a) (West 2006). 
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provided that the requirements of notice, causation, foreseeability, 
“palpably unreasonable” condition of the property, and permanency of 
injury are met. 
Despite acknowledging that public housing authorities must 
operate within limited budgets and are precluded by state and federal 
statutes from raising rents, the New Jersey Supreme Court found “no 
reason to treat public landlords differently from other commercial 
landlords” in Bligen v. Jersey City Housing Authority.
82
 In Bligen the 
plaintiff was on her way to meet a friend when she stepped off the curb 
into the parking area outside her public housing project when she 
slipped and fell, severely fracturing her wrist.
83
 Although there had been 
a snowstorm the previous Friday, no snow had been cleared over the 
weekend.
84
 The Court held that the public housing authority was not 
entitled to immunity under the Act and the common law immunity for 
the negligent removal of snow does not apply to public housing 
authorities because public housing authorities were deemed to have the 
same obligation to their tenants as commercial landlords under the 
common law.
85
 Displaying his renowned wit, Justice Clifford in his 
dissent stated “the Court skate[d] on thin ice” with its decision in Bligen 
as public entity immunity for garden-variety snow removal activities 
“ha[d] been frozen in our jurisprudence for a quarter of a century.”
86
 
Declaring the majority opinion a “snow job” Justice Clifford 
“suggest[ed] that the integrity of the common law would be better 
served by an outright acknowledgement that the Court is shoveling a 
new path.”
87
 
In Roman v. City of Plainfield, the City of Plainfield forbade the 
owner of property abutting the sidewalk from cutting the roots of the 
City’s tree which grew under the sidewalk.  The City assured the 
property owner it would take care of the roots so the sidewalk could be 
repaired. The question was whether this assurance constituted sufficient 
evidence of “control” of that private property within the meaning of N.J. 
STAT. ANN. section 59:4-1(c). The Roman court held that in assuring the 
property owner that it would remove the roots, the City exercised 
 
82 Bligen v. Jersey City Hous. Auth., 619 A.2d 575, 581 (N.J. 1993). 
83 Id. at 571. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 582. 
86 Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
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sufficient control over the property to render itself subject to liability for 
the plaintiff’s injuries under the Act. 
D. Mixed Use 
The realm of mixed commercial/residential use property is perhaps 
the most unfair, non-uniform and unpredictable area of New Jersey 
sidewalk liability law. State courts utilize a “predominant use” test to 
determine how a mixed-use property should be categorized for purposes 
of liability. The courts consider factors including extent of income and 
extent of non-owner occupancy in terms of time and space to determine 
whether the owner’s residential occupancy preponderates. If there are 
factual disputes with respect to these factors, or if it is not clear how to 
weigh them, resolution by a trier of fact is required.
88
 The need to 
determine predominant use on a case-by-case basis leaves little 
jurisprudential guidance.
89
 
In Hambright v. Yglesias, the Appellate Division held a landlord 
liable for failure to remove ice from a sidewalk abutting a two-family 
house in which both units were occupied by tenants, considering the 
house to be more commercial in nature than residential.
90
 The plaintiff 
slipped and fell on an icy public sidewalk in front of a two-family house 
owned by the defendant.
91
 Though the sidewalk was “an entire sheet of 
ice” the plaintiff decided to take a “calculated risk” and attempted to 
navigate it.
92
 Hambright brought suit to recover for her ensuing 
injuries.
93
 On appeal, defendant contended that his property was not a 
commercial property within the meaning of Stewart and Mirza.
94
 The 
 
88 Avallone v. Mortimer, 599 A.2d 1034, 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
89 The Appellate Division recognized some of the difficult practical implications of the 
mixed-use analysis in Smith v. Young, 692 A.2d 76, 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997):  
The Stewart/Mirza rule . . . creates significant ancillary problems, apart from 
those of direct interpretation and application. For example, if a property owner 
who resides in a two or three-family home and rents the other flat or flats at 
market rates, is considered, as a matter of law, to be engaged in a commercial 
use, it may be that the owner will experience difficulty in obtaining coverage 
under a homeowner’s insurance policy which contains a business pursuits 
exclusion, notwithstanding that the property is used only for residential 
purposes. See Wickner v. Am. Reliance Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1256, 1259-61 (N.J. 
1995). 
90 Hambright v. Yglesias, 491 A.2d 768, 769 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 769-70. 
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court in Hambright noted that Stewart made clear that it was the nature 
of the ownership that mattered, not the use to which the property is put.
95
 
Recognizing the inherent difficulty in classifying a building that has two 
important uses, the court stated “[a]partment buildings are residential in 
the sense that they are places where people live; they are commercial in 
the sense that they are operated by their owners as a business.”
96
 Here, 
because it was undisputed the property was owned and operated as a 
business venture, the court found it was a commercial property within 
the meaning of Stewart and Mirza.
97
 Foretelling controversies yet to 
come in which the necessary line-drawing would be even more 
arbitrary, the court “express[ed] no opinion as to the result where a two-
family house is partly owner-occupied.”
98
 
Another example of the mixed use dilemma was provided in 
Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, in which a fraternity house was treated 
as commercial property.
99
 Defendant Zeta Psi owned and maintained a 
fraternity house on the New Brunswick campus of Rutgers University, 
which abutted a public sidewalk running along College Avenue.
100
 The 
plaintiff was walking on the public sidewalk in front of defendant’s 
fraternity house when she fell, sustaining injury.
101
 The defendant 
conceded that the sidewalk was in disrepair, but nevertheless contended 
that it was entitled to summary judgment as an owner of residential 
property pursuant to the rule of nonliability set forth in Stewart.
102
 
Defendant argued that the property in question, owned by the Zeta 
Psi Alumni Association, was used exclusively as a home for 
undergraduate students who were members of the fraternity and was 
therefore residential in character.
103
 In support of its position, the 
defendant pointed out that the Alumni Association which oversaw the 
operation was comprised of individuals who volunteered their 
services.
104
 The defendant further asserted that, with the exception of the 
 
95 Id.  
96 Hambright, 419 A.2d at 769. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 578 A.2d 1264, 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1990). 
100 Id. at 1265. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 1266. 
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chef, there were no paid positions at the fraternity.
105
 The fraternity 
house provided living space for forty-two undergraduate members, each 
paying a fee for room and board.
106
 
The defendant argued that the sole purpose of the house was to 
provide a place for fraternity members to live while attending school but 
conceded that many resided in dormitories and other non-fraternity 
owned housing.
107
 All members, whether residents or not, paid dues 
utilized by the fraternity to pay for social functions.
108
 
Despite noting that the fraternity house was a nonprofit 
organization, the court held that defendant Zeta Psi was a hybrid 
organization, both commercial and residential: commercial in the sense 
that it functioned as a social club for all its members and alumni and 
residential by virtue of the fact that forty-two members resided there 
during the school year.
109
 As such, the court denied the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that for the purposes of 
sidewalk liability – in accordance with the rule established in Stewart – 
the fraternity was a commercial property owner subject to liability for 
negligent maintenance of the sidewalk abutting its premises.
110
 
Conversely, in Borges v. Hamed, a three family owner-occupied 
home in which two of the units were rented was treated as residential.
111
 
Plaintiff Albertina Borges fell on the sidewalk in front of a three-
apartment house owned by defendants Faiez and Lourdes Hamed.
112
 
Borges sued the Hameds for damages resulting from her injuries.
113
 The 
property in question was a legal three-family house owned by the 
Hameds.
114
 They lived in the third floor apartment.
115
 Ms. Hamed’s 
mother, stepfather and brothers occupied the second floor apartment.
116
 
Her sister, her sister’s husband and their children lived on the first 
 
105 Gilhooly, 578 A.2d at 1265-66. 
106 Id. at 1266. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1267. 
110 Id. at 1267-68. 
111 Borges v. Hamed, 589 A.2d 169, 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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floor.
117
 The second and first floor tenants paid rent, but there was 
nothing in the record to show if the rent paid yielded a profit or merely 
covered the costs of owning and running the building.
118
 The court held 
that this “vertical family compound” could not be considered a 
commercial property.
119
 Unlike the fraternity house in Gilhooly, the 
Hameds’ property was not used for social purposes. Like the Hambright 
court, the court in Borges explicitly noted it was not considering what 
the result should be if defendants lived in one apartment and rented the 
other two at market rates.
120
 
A slightly different circumstance was found in Smith v. Young, 
which involved a co-owned, two-family home, “unquestionably 
residential in use.”
121
 One of the co-owners, defendant Young, occupied 
the first floor, and had been living on the property for more than twenty-
five years.
122
 She considered herself the owner of the portion of the 
property in which she resided.
123
 The co-owner of the remaining interest 
in the property was the estate of Ms. Young’s sister, defendant Lorraine 
Benjamin, who died before the plaintiff’s injuries occurred and who had 
lived on the second floor.
124
 At the time the plaintiff’s injuries occurred, 
the estate’s co-ownership interest in the property was managed by 
Deborah Benjamin, Lorraine’s daughter.
125
 Deborah Benjamin rented out 
the second floor to unrelated tenants and collected the rent on behalf of 
the estate.
126
 Ms. Young looked after the property and hired a handyman 
to clear the sidewalk of snow and ice whenever necessary.
127
 The co-
owners divided the costs of property maintenance and repair.
128
 
The court held that just as the activities of the private school in 
Brown had no residential characteristics, the uses here had no real 
commercial qualities: “[w]e may choose to label rental of a single flat, 
presumably at market rates, as commercial for Stewart/Mirza 
 
117 Borges, 589 A.2d at 170. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Smith v. Young, 692 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Smith, 692 A.2d at 84. 
128 Id. 
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classification purposes, but doing so does not transform the activity, as a 
matter of fact, into a business.”
129
 The court noted the difficulties of 
classifying a property such as this within the Stewart/Mirza framework. 
And how, in the peculiar facts of this case, would the calculation be 
made? Would the rental income of the tenanted flat be balanced 
against the whole of the carrying costs even though half of those 
costs are borne by a residing owner who receives none of the rental 
income? Is only half of the rental income to be balanced against the 
half of the carrying charges borne by the owner who receives all of 
the rent? Would either approach, or any other, be a real basis of 
decision, or would it be one artificially created to deal with the 
apparent equities of the particular situation in the light of a dictated 
need to classify the property?
130
 
Despite its resistance to articulating an alternate approach based 
upon the unique facts of the case, the court lamented that “Stewart 
requires that the property be classified.”
131
 The court held that the 
owners did not have a duty to maintain the abutting sidewalk because 
the New Jersey Supreme Court did not intend for small owner-occupied 
dwellings to be subsumed within the classification of commercial 
property.
132
 The court concluded its analysis by expressing its frustration 
in the arbitrary uncertainty in this area of the law, noting it was “aware 
that this holding does nothing to resolve the classification issues 
regarding all non-owner-occupied properties and those that are owner-
occupied but accommodate more than two or three families.”
133
 The 
court predicted that “the lingering difficulties that the currently 
prevailing rule imposes will persist as long as courts are required to 
classify properties according to the existing commercial/residential 
dichotomy.”
134
 
In a landmark case affirmed on appeal, the Appellate Division in 
Luchejko v. City of Hoboken held that a condominium association was 
not a commercial entity for the purpose of sidewalk liability.
135
 The 
plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on a public sidewalk abutting a 104 unit 
 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 85. 
133 Smith, 692 A.2d at 85. 
134 Id. 
135 Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 998 A.2d 506, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), 
aff’d, 23 A.3d 912 (N.J. 2011).  
BURKE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2012  1:58 PM 
2012 NEW JERSEY SIDEWALK LIABILITY 245 
condominium complex in Hoboken.
136
 Skyline Condominium 
Association (Skyline) was the entity responsible for maintaining the 
adjacent sidewalks and other common elements of the building.
137
 
Skyline contracted with CM3 Management Company (CM3) to manage 
the property, and CM3 hired D&D Snow Plowing Company (D&D) to 
provide snow plowing services for all the sidewalks surrounding the 
building.
138
 The plaintiff asserted that at the time he fell, the sidewalk 
was covered in black ice and partially covered in snow.
139
 The plaintiff 
sued the City of Hoboken, Skyline and CM3 and subsequently filed an 
amended complaint adding D&D as a defendant.
140
 
The plaintiff argued that Skyline was a commercial entity for 
purposes of sidewalk liability.
141
 Citing Stewart, the court stated the 
general rule is that apartment complexes are characterized as 
commercial and thus are generally responsible for maintaining any 
abutting sidewalks.
142
 However, the court cited the defendants’ 
properties in Borges and Smith as examples of multi-family buildings 
that were not held liable for sidewalk defects under Stewart.
143
 The court 
concluded that a property would not be considered commercial if it is 
predominantly owner-occupied.
144
 Highlighting the complex nature of 
the inquiry, the court discussed a balancing test to be employed in 
situations like this, noting the tensions between the nature of ownership 
and the ability to pass along liability.
145
 The court determined the key 
issue in determining whether a property is commercial turns on its 
 
136 Id. at 509. 
137 Id.  
138 Id.   
139 Id. The snow that remained on the sidewalk was in violation of a Hoboken ordinance 
requiring snow to be removed from sidewalks within six hours.  
The owner or occupant or person having charge of any dwelling house, store or 
other building or lot of ground in the city shall, within the first (6) hours after 
every fall of snow or hail, or after the formation of any ice upon the sidewalks, 
unless the ice is covered with sand or ashes, cause the snow and ice to be 
removed from the sidewalk abutting such dwelling house, store, building or lot 
of land and piled not more than eighteen (18) inches from the curb line into the 
public street or road.  
HOBOKEN, N.J., CODE § 168-8(A) (1994). 
140 Id.  
141 Luchejko, 998 A.2d at 511. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 512-13. 
144 Id. at 513. 
145 Id. 
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income-generating capacity.
146
 Here, Skyline was a nonprofit 
corporation and its membership was open only to unit owners.
147
 
Although the corporation collected fees, the funds were used solely for 
the upkeep of the property, and no profit was realized by the 
corporation.
148
 The court held that this is different from a rental 
apartment building, which is considered commercial due to the owner’s 
capacity to generate income from the property.
149
 The court reasoned 
that though Skyline did have the capacity to spread the risk of loss 
arising from injuries on abutting sidewalks “through higher charges for 
the commercial enterprise’s goods and services,”
150
 Skyline did not 
provide the public with goods or services and therefore could not 
increase revenue collection to accommodate such liability.
151
 
Lastly, the court held that a property should not be considered 
commercial if it is predominantly owner-occupied.
152
 Skyline’s 
underlying nature was predominantly owner-occupied and it was unable 
to generate an overall income and spread the risk of loss through higher 
charges on goods and services.
153
 The court concluded that Skyline was 
not subject to sidewalk liability pursuant to Stewart and there was no 
basis from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Skyline was a 
commercial entity.
154
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed 
the Appellate Division on appeal.
155
 In a lengthy opinion, the Court 
attempted to synthesize over 100 years of sidewalk liability as a 
seamless evolution of sentiment on tort liability for sidewalk defects. 
The Court seemed intent on insisting it had been ideologically 
consistent all along, referring to its line of opinions glowingly. At 
various points in its opinion the Court stated “We did not then extend 
sidewalk liability to residential properties . . . and have not done so 
 
146 Id. 
147 Luchejko, 998 A.2d at 513. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. (citing Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 889 n.7 (N.J. 1981). 
150 Id. (citing Mirza v. Fillmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. 1983). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 514 (citing Avallone v. Mortimer, 599 A.2d 1034, 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1991). 
153 Luchejko, 998 A.2d at 513 (citing Mirza, 456 A.2d at 522); Abraham v. Gupta, 656 
A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
154 Id. at 514. 
155 Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 23 A.3d 912, 914 (N.J. 2011). 
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since”
156
; and “[t]here is no call to upset the well-established and 
longstanding difference in the duties imposed on residential versus 
commercial property owners”
157
; and “[i]t was of considerable 
consequence that the new rule was being adopted only for commercial 
property owners. . . .”
158
 Seeming a bit defensive of the clarity, or lack 
thereof, of New Jersey case law on the matter, the Court stated: 
In cases since, we may have grappled with what was or was not 
commercial property, but we have not deviated in our holdings or in 
our discussions of the law . . . .
159
 
However, the inconsistencies in the Court’s treatment of sidewalk 
liability law are readily apparent from the start. In a delicate balancing 
act, the Court instructs that even though it has been ideologically 
consistent as to the division of burdens between residential property 
owners and commercial property owners, when analyzing nonprofit 
owners, “the examination must focus on ‘the nature of the use of the 
property and not the nature of the ownership.’”
160
 Further complicating 
the inquiry, the Court stated it is not important whether actual profit is 
obtained through use of the property, but “whether a property’s 
predominant use has the capacity to generate income . . . .”
161
 
Despite heralding Stewart’s “multiple reasons that supported 
imposition of the new rule for commercial entities”
162
 the Court noted 
that in Stewart the majority stated apartment buildings would be 
considered commercial properties under the new rule. Thirty years later 
in Luchejko, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found a 104-unit 
condominium complex in one of New Jersey’s largest cities to be a 
residential property.
163
 The Court brushed aside the plethora of 
confusing opinions post-Stewart that have complicated the analysis of 
liability for sidewalk defects in New Jersey, stating “we need not 
address the universe of appellate decisions, with their fine 
distinctions.”
164
 These “fine distinctions” have made sidewalk liability 
the wild west of New Jersey tort law. 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 918-20. 
159 Id. at 920 (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted).  
160 Id. at 920 (emphasis added). 
161 Luchejko, 23 A.3d at 921 (emphasis added). 
162 Id. at 918. 
163 Id. at 924. 
164 Id. at 921. 
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The dissent noted that despite the majority’s resoluteness in the 
uniformity of the Court’s decisions since Stewart, “[t]he Appellate 
Division and trial courts have grappled with the commercial-residential 
distinction established in Stewart with varying results.”
165
 The dissent 
also noted that the confusion bred by Stewart has led to commercial 
property owners being exempt from liability and liability imposed on 
owners of residential property.
166
 Despite reaffirming the difficulties 
Stewart has created, however, the dissent argued not for a return to a 
bright line rule but for an even more wishy-washy “weighing and 
balancing duty analysis.”
167
 Though not this Article’s recommended 
course of action, the dissent’s take on the duty analysis of sidewalk 
liability law in New Jersey was at least more honest, as it considered the 
Stewart court’s public policy reason for extending liability to 
commercial property owners without compelling “classif[ication] [of] 
properties according to the . . . commercial/residential dichotomy.”
168
 
Capitalizing on the confusion resulting from the Stewart decision 
acknowledged by the majority in Luchejko, the plaintiff in Mohamed v. 
Iglesia Evangelica Oasis de Salvacion argued that a church that allows 
parish members to use its basement to celebrate birthdays and other 
events for nominal donations was “partially commercial” because it 
engaged in this economic activity.
169
 The church also gave parishioners 
and their friends permission to park in its lot while they use public 
transportation or go shopping in the area.
170
 Some gave donations for 
this privilege, while others did not.
171
 The plaintiff argued that because 
the church was “partially commercial” she should be compensated for 
injuries sustained when she tripped on the sidewalk in front of the 
church.
172
 The court determined it would have to decide whether the use 
of the church was, in fact, commercial, noting that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Stewart provided little guidance on the issue.
173
 The 
 
165 Id. at 929 (Long, J., dissenting). 
166 “[S]ome premises which serve only as residences have found their way into the so-
called “commercial” category . . . and some clearly non-residential premises have been 
spared from liability . . . .” Id. at 930 (Long, J., dissenting). 
167 Luchejko, 23 A.3d at 930. 
168 Smith v. Young, 692 A.2d 76, 100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
169 Mohamed v. Iglesia Evangelica Oasis de Salvacion, 30 A.3d 376, 376 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 2011).  
170 Id. at 376-77. 
171 Id. at 377. 
172 Id. at 376. 
173 “[The Stewart Court] intentionally gave little guidance as to what should constitute a 
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court discussed Brown, wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that using a church-owned property as a nonprofit religious school made 
the property commercial, and Restivo, where the court held a church 
liable for injuries caused by a defect on an abutting sidewalk because 
the church leased part of its premises to a nonprofit organization that 
rented space to needy families and employees for little or no rent.
174
 
Despite citing and discussing these instances whereby churches had 
been held liable as commercial enterprises even when engaging in 
charitable, nonprofit enterprises in furtherance of their mission, the 
court in Mohamed determined the church was immune from liability 
because “[a]lthough some money might exchange hands . . . the lack of 
formality and regulation indicates something less than a commercial 
enterprise.”
175
 Notably, the court failed to cite any support for the 
assertion that “formality” and “regulation” are indicia of a commercial 
enterprise.
176
 
This inconsistency of results reflects the Stewart rule’s 
unworkability. In Hambright, a two family house rented to tenants was 
deemed a commercial property, while in Luchejko a large apartment 
building in Hoboken was deemed a residential property. The church in 
Hamed collected money for use of its property yet retained its 
immunity, while the church-owned building housing a nonprofit school 
and apartments for the poor in Restivo was deemed a commercial 
enterprise. While some landlords, such as the landlord in Hambright, do 
garner a profit renting to tenants, they are also providing a benefit to the 
 
‘commercial’ property.” Id. at 378. 
174 Id. 
175 Mohamed, 30 A.3d at 379 (emphasis added). 
176 The Appellate Division reversed and remanded as the discovery period still had 
another five months to run when the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. Mohamed v. Iglesia Evangelica Oasis de Salvacion, 38 A.3d 669, 673 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). Depositions of the church’s treasurer and pastor had recently 
been taken, and both testified that members and non-members of the church used the 
parking lot while shopping or commuting to work. Id. at 672. The church’s treasurer 
admitted that donations were made by those who used the lot, that payments were made by 
check, and that records of donations by non-members were kept in a separate ledger. Id. The 
transcripts of these depositions were not available for the court’s review at the time 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment was being considered, though the transcripts 
were provided as part of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Id. at 673. 
Citing Restivo, the court held that as “liability can be found, even against a nonprofit 
organization that uses the property for primarily religious purposes, if the organization 
engages in some degree of commercial activity on the premises” plaintiff should have been 
allowed to continue discovery to determine if acceptance of donations for use of the parking 
lot amounted to commercial activity. Id. at 675. 
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community. Not everyone can afford a home, so some people must rent 
or go homeless. Depending on the level of exposure to liability from a 
defective sidewalk, some homeowners might find that it is cheaper and 
more prudent to sell a house or let it sit vacant than to rent. 
III. LIABILITY FOR NATURAL CONDITIONS 
Theories of liability for unsafe conditions caused by natural 
circumstances such as tree roots growing under and lifting or cracking 
sidewalks, as in Roman, is another aspect of sidewalk law that is 
changing. Traditionally, no liability attached to an abutting property 
owner for injuries sustained by individuals outside the property if the 
condition that produced the injury was “natural” as opposed to 
“artificial.”
177
 The traditional distinction between “natural” conditions of 
land and artificial conditions has been steadily eroding. Prosser & 
Keeton discussed this erosion in their treatise on torts.
178
 In addressing 
the issue of “non-liability” of property owners for a natural condition of 
land, they distinguished between rural and urban areas, recognizing the 
evolution of the land and the law: 
The rule of non-liability for natural conditions was obviously a 
practical necessity in the early days, when land was very largely in a 
primitive state. It remains to a considerable extent a necessity in rural 
communities, where the burden of inspecting and improving the land 
is likely to be entirely disproportionate not only to any threatened 
harm but even to the value of the land itself. But it is scarcely suited 
to cities, to say that a landowner may escape all liability for serious 
damage to his neighbors, merely by allowing nature to take its 
course. A different rule accordingly has been developing as to urban 
centers.
179
 
In Burke v. Briggs, the Appellate Division gave approval to this 
eroding distinction, stating that it is too antiquated as a basis for 
determining actionability.
180
 Rather, the court honed its focus on the duty 
of reasonable care, which may shift depending on a range of factors. It 
determined this case-by-case approach would be more equitable than 
assigning liability based on whether the nuisance was created by a 
 
177 PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 57 (5th ed. 1984). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Burke v. Briggs, 571 A.2d 296, 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
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natural or artificial condition.
181
 
The issue has also been addressed by the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which also imposes liability for natural conditions under some 
circumstances: 
Natural Conditions “(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a 
possessor of land, nor a vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable 
for physical harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural 
condition of the land. (2) A possessor of land in an urban area is 
subject to liability to persons using a public highway for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent 
an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on 
the land near the highway.
182
 
Thus, the trend is decidedly away from a rule of no liability for 
natural conditions and toward a rule imposing a duty to inspect for and 
make safe dangerous conditions. Pursuant to this analysis, the question 
is whether the abutting property owner exercised reasonable care and if 
a reasonable inspection by the abutting property owner would have 
revealed an unsafe condition of the public sidewalk, impeding the safe 
passage of pedestrians on the sidewalk. The existence of a hazardous 
condition which is discoverable by reasonable inspection imputes 
liability. 
Dangerous conditions caused by natural accumulations of snow 
and ice on sidewalks have made the Stewart rule more problematic. In 
Mirza v. Filmore Corp.,
183
 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the 
duty of commercial property owners to include inspecting for and 
removing or making safe accumulations of snow and ice on the adjacent 
sidewalk. Ignoring the long-standing immunity for liability caused by 
natural accumulations of snow and ice, the Court stated: “No functional 
basis exists to differentiate an accumulation of snow or ice from other 
hazards.”
184
 Like Stewart, Mirza overturned decades of precedent in 
which commercial property owners were not liable for failing to remove 
snow and ice. 
The Mirza Court held that a test of reasonableness would be 
 
181 Id. 
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1977). 
183 Mirza v. Fillmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 524 (N.J. 1983) (“[w]e also hold that 
maintenance of the public sidewalk abutting commercial properties under Stewart includes 
removal or reduction of the hazard of snow and ice dependent upon the standard of care of a 
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.”). 
184 Id. at 521. 
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applied in determining whether a commercial property owner fulfilled 
the duty to remove snow and ice from an abutting sidewalk.
185
 The Court 
framed the inquiry as whether “after actual or constructive notice, [an 
abutting commercial owner] has not acted in a reasonably prudent 
manner under the circumstances to remove or reduce the hazard.”
186
 
Further, while previously there was no common law duty to take 
affirmative action to make safe natural accumulations of snow and ice, 
“an abutting landowner who invades the public easement exclusively 
for his own benefit is responsible for the resultant hazardous 
condition.”
187
 
Thus under the Stewart and Davis combination, a commercial 
property owner has an affirmative obligation to remove unsafe natural 
accumulations of snow and ice on an abutting sidewalk. This leads to 
another example of the lack of uniformity, predictability and fairness of 
the Stewart rule. As a general proposition, an abutting homeowner owes 
no duty to pedestrians using the abutting sidewalk to remove ice and 
snow under New Jersey law, but may be fined for failing to remove 
snow and ice in accordance with local municipal law.
188
 A fine from the 
borough or township for failing to comply with a local snow/ice 
removal ordinance, however, does not provide the basis for tort liability 
to a pedestrian who slips and falls and is injured on one’s sidewalk.
189
 
The law in New Jersey regarding snow and ice removal and injured 
pedestrians is as such: If a homeowner does nothing to remove ice or 
snow from his or her premises and a person is injured as a result of the 
snow or ice accumulation, there exists no liability. However, the law 
takes a bizarre twist and imposes liability on a homeowner for a poor 
job shoveling snow if a pedestrian slips on a poorly shoveled sidewalk. 
Confirming the saying “no good deed goes unpunished” it may be 
prudent for a homeowner to refrain from attempting to make the 
sidewalk safer. 
Recognizing the absurdity of the current state of the law, Justice 
Clifford urged the Court to abandon the Stewart rule in his Concurring 
Opinion in Mirza, cogently stating: 
 
185 Id. at 521-22. 
186 Id. at 521. 
187 Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 53 (N.J. 1975). 
188 Sarah Schillaci, After Major Storms, New Jersey Towns Crack Down on Snow 
Removal, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/02/ 
after_major_storms_new_jersey.html. 
189 Lambe v. Reardon, 173 A.2d 520, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). 
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And so another long-standing principle of law melts away, this one 
under the fervid heat generated by Stewart. I thought then, as I do 
now, that Stewart was wrongly decided; that its rule is both 
unjustified and unwise; and that Yanhko represented the correct 
approach to sidewalk cases . . . . Five members of the Court joined in 
Yanhko’s majority opinion. There remains but one. Nothing has 
changed in the six years since Yanhko’s definitive treatment of the 
subject – no “new” developments in sidewalk construction or 
maintenance, in snow-clearing methods, in society’s mores, in the 
weight of authority elsewhere (it continues to be against Stewart and 
today’s rule) – nothing save the composition of this Court.
190
 
A survey of case law shows sidewalk liability precedent to be 
wildly inconsistent. Commercial property owners are always liable for 
sidewalk defects, even if they did not create the defect. Residential 
homeowners are generally not liable for defects to a sidewalk or natural 
accumulations of snow and ice but may be liable for snow and ice 
conditions if they attempt to make a sidewalk safer for pedestrians by 
negligent attempts to address snow and ice. Religious and charitable 
institutions may be held liable if they provide a public service the courts 
deem “commercial” such as a daycare center or a school, even if the 
institution generates no profit. Mixed use property may or may not be 
commercial, depending on whether the owner of the property lives on 
site, and who the owner rents to. The size of the property and the 
number  of residents have no bearing on the property owner’s liability 
for sidewalk defects; a two-family home in a residential area was 
deemed commercial in Hambright, while a large apartment building in a 
major New Jersey city with hundreds of occupants was deemed 
residential in Luchejko. 
IV. OWNERSHIP OF SIDEWALKS 
The broad structure for sidewalk law in New Jersey is outlined in 
Title 40, Chapter 65. N.J. STAT. ANN. section 40:65-1 gives 
municipalities the authority to adopt ordinances providing for sidewalk 
improvements and repairs such as construction, paving, and curbing. 
The work may be funded and performed by the municipality, the 
adjacent property owner or both. Municipalities are authorized to 
inspect sidewalks and adopt standards for their construction.
191
 
 
190 Mirza, 456 A.2d at 524 (Clifford, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
191 Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-1 (West 1992): 
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The statute considers a sidewalk to be an element of the street, 
implying public ownership. The most common procedure used by 
municipalities to pay for new sidewalks or the repair or reconstruction 
of existing curb and sidewalk is to assess the abutting property owners 
for all or a portion of the costs. N.J. STAT. ANN. section 40:65-2 to -9 
sets forth procedures that a municipality must follow when it decides to 
construct a sidewalk along a roadway at the full or partial expense of 
abutting property owners. Such a municipality is required to provide 
adequate notice of the municipality’s plans and allow property owners a 
chance to construct the sidewalks.
192
 If the property owner or owners do 
not make the required improvements at their own expense, or if the 
municipality has agreed to share in the cost of constructing the 
sidewalk, the municipality is allowed to construct the sidewalk and 
assess the costs to be born to abutting property owners.
193
 N.J. STAT. 
ANN. section 40:65-9 allows sidewalk assessments to be treated the 
same as local improvements in terms of payment procedures; 
municipalities may also assess property owners in installments over 
time.
194
 N.J. STAT. ANN. section 40:65-9.1 provides conditions for 
 
The governing body may make, amend, repeal and enforce ordinances: To 
regulate and provide for the construction and reconstruction, paving and 
repaving, curbing and recurbing, repairing and improving of the sidewalks of 
the streets and highways of the municipality, wholly at the cost of the 
municipality or wholly at the cost of the owner or owners of the real estate in 
front of which the improvement is made, or at the cost of the municipality and 
such owner or owners, to prescribe the method thereof, the materials to be used 
therein and the inspection thereof. 
192 The notice provision is set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-2 (West 1992): 
The notice shall contain a description of the property affected sufficient to 
identify it, a description of the improvement, and a statement of the percentage 
of the cost to be borne by the owner or owners of such real estate, if the cost 
thereof is to be borne in part by such owners, or a statement that unless the 
owner or owners complete the same within 30 days after service thereof the 
municipality will make the improvement at the expense of the owners, if the 
cost of the improvement is to be borne wholly by the owner or owners of such 
real estate. 
193 Costs are to be apportioned to abutting property owners based upon street frontage: 
The officer of the municipality in charge of such improvement shall keep an 
accurate account of the cost thereof and if such cost or any part thereof is to be 
assessed upon the several properties fronting on the improvement, shall assess 
such cost or the proportion thereof required to be assessed under said ordinance 
upon such properties in proportion to their respective frontage thereon . . . . 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-8 (West 1992). 
194 Municipalities may also charge interest: 
Such sidewalk assessments shall bear interest from the time of confirmation at 
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reconstructing sidewalks or curbs wholly at municipal expense. 
It is important to recognize that N.J. STAT. ANN. section 40:65-1 – 
the statute authorizing municipalities to assess property owners for the 
cost of constructing or reconstructing sidewalks – is different from the 
statutes that authorize municipalities to create special benefit 
assessment districts. The responsibility for constructing and maintaining 
sidewalks in New Jersey rests with the abutting property owners; 
although as discussed above, municipalities, counties and the state are 
all authorized to pay for all or a portion of such costs. When sidewalk 
improvements have been made and are to be assessed to the abutting 
property owner, the assessment is made not based on the benefit to the 
property owner but rather the proportional frontage of a property along 
the subject street. This assessment reflects the statutory responsibility a 
property owner has to maintain the pedestrian way on which the 
property abuts. 
This approach to funding sidewalk management dates back to the 
traditional method by which roadway improvements were funded. 
Under English law, the maintenance of the public way in front of one’s 
property was the responsibility of the property owner.
195
 As a result, no 
benefit to the property owner has to be shown – instead, it is the 
property owner’s responsibility to perform the sidewalk management 
 
the same rate and with the same penalties for nonpayment as assessments for 
local improvements in the municipality, and from the confirmation thereof shall 
be a first and paramount lien upon the real estate assessed to the same extent 
and be collected and enforced in the same manner as assessments for local 
improvements. The governing body may provide for the payment and collection 
of such assessments in installments in the same manner and at the same rate of 
interest as assessments for local improvements are payable in installments in the 
municipality. No such assessments shall be invalid by reason of error in the 
statement or omission of the name of any owner or owners of real estate 
assessed, or for any other informality, where such real estate has been actually 
improved. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-9 (West 1992). 
195 The Highways Act of 1835 provided: 
And be it further enacted, that the said Surveyor shall and he is hereby required 
to make, support and maintain, or cause to be made, supported and maintained 
every public Cartway leading to any Market Town twenty feet wide at the least, 
and every public Horseway eight Feet wide at the least, and to support and 
maintain every public footway by the side of any Carriageway or Cartway 
Three feet at the least, if the Ground between the fences including the same will 
admit thereof. 
Highways Act, 1835, 7 Will. 4, c. 50 s, LXXX, available at http://www.legislation.gov. 
uk/ukpga/1835/50/pdfs/ukpga_18350050_en.pdf (emphasis added). 
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tasks. As discussed previously, however, liability for injuries created by 
sidewalk defects depends on the abutting property owner’s 
classification. 
Although it has authorized municipalities to impose the costs of 
sidewalk construction on individual property owners, the New Jersey 
Legislature has declined to clarify who retains responsibility for the 
sidewalk once it is constructed. It is evident, however, the statutory 
scheme contemplates public ownership of the sidewalk, as the provision 
providing for public funding of construction, or reconstruction due to 
natural dilapidation and wear, states that entirely public funding is 
permissible when the denigration was not caused by the “abutting 
property owner or his predecessor in title” and “[w]hen the abutting 
property owner or his predecessor in title shall have paid within twenty 
years then last past, or shall pay, in full with interest all the assessment 
for the laying or relaying of the sidewalk in front of his property . . . .”
196
 
This language also implicitly acknowledges that absent affirmative 
conduct of the property owner leading to deterioration of the sidewalk, 
responsibility for care and maintenance lies with the municipality. 
V. SIDEWALK LIABILITY LAW IN OTHER STATES 
A. New York 
Only within the last decade has New York imposed upon its 
citizens the obligation to tend to the sidewalks abutting their 
property.
197
 Because property owners had no duty per se to an injured 
pedestrian, plaintiffs had to prove the property owner assumed a duty by 
creating a dangerous condition or making the natural condition on the 
 
196 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-9.1 (West 1992) (emphasis added). While it seems unfair, a 
property owner’s obligation to maintain abutting public property is not without precedent. In 
Thirteenth Century England, the Statute of Winchester of 1285 endeavoured to check the 
activities of the highway robber by placing on the property owner the additional liability of 
making good to the person robbed the loss he had sustained in his territory. The Act also 
provided that highways leading from one market town to another should be so opened out 
that there should not be any “dike, tree or bush wherein a man might lurk to do hurt, within 
200 feet on one side and 200 feet on the other side of the road, but it was not to extend to 
great Oaks or other trees so that they be clear underneath.” Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 
Edw., c. 2 (Eng.).  
197 D’Ambrosio v. City of New York, 435 N.E.2d 366, 367 (N.Y. 1982). See also 
Loforese v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Centers, 652 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) (citations omitted) (“An owner of land abutting a public sidewalk does not, solely by 
reason of being an abutting owner, owe a duty to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition . . . 
.”). 
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sidewalk more hazardous.
198
 In keeping with common law tradition, tort 
liability to third parties will not be imposed against an owner or lessee 
of adjoining property in New York absent a statute specifically 
imposing liability for failure to clear the sidewalk.
199
 Prior to 2003, the 
City of New York was inundated with tens of thousands of new cases 
every year to defend against sidewalk liability, which created 
substantial budgetary constraints while absorbing valuable resources 
within the City government. According to Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 
from 2001 to 2003 the City paid over $189 million for damages caused 
by sidewalk defects and slip and falls.
200
 
When suing the City of New York, plaintiffs are required to file a 
formal Notice of Claim under the General Municipal Law within ninety 
days of the accident as a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit.
201
 On 
September 15, 2003, a new law went into effect in New York City 
shifting the duty for damage or injuries caused by sidewalk conditions 
from the City to real property owners. Under an amendment to section 
7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, property 
became liable for injuries as a result of dangerous conditions or defects 
in the sidewalk. Specifically, property owners are liable for “the 
negligent failure to install, construct, reconstruct, repave, repair or 
replace defective sidewalk flags and the negligent failure to remove 
snow, ice, dirt and other material from the sidewalk.”
202
 As a result of 
section 7-210, both commercial and residential property owners will 
now be liable for an abutting sidewalk which is negligently maintained, 
defective, or in a dangerous condition. 
B. Massachusetts 
A similar change was recently made in Massachusetts, where the 
Supreme Judicial Court overturned 100 years of precedent in 
announcing that all Massachusetts property owners are legally 
responsible for the removal of snow and ice from their property. The old 
common law rule was that owners could leave naturally accumulated 
 
198 Nadel v. Cucinella, 750 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Gibbs v. 
Rochdale Vill., Inc., 724 N.Y.S.2d 324, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).  
199 Booth v. City of New York, 707 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
200 Debra A. Estock, Sidewalk Liability Now Falls to Property Owners, THE 
COOPERATOR: THE CO-OP AND CONDO MONTHLY, available at 
http://cooperator.com/articles/916/1/Sidewalk-Liability/Page1.html. 
201 N.Y. GMU. LAW § 50-e. 
202 N.Y. ADC. LAW § 7-210. 
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snow and ice untouched and escape liability. The Supreme Judicial 
Court in Papadopoulos v. Target Corp. held that all Massachusetts 
property owners must remove or treat snow and ice like any other 
dangerous condition on property.
203
 The Court rejected the old rule, 
holding it “is not reasonable for a property owner to leave snow or ice 
on a walkway where it is reasonable to expect that a hardy New 
England visitor would choose to risk crossing the snow or ice, rather 
than turn back or attempt an equally or more perilous walk around it.”
204
 
C. Michigan 
Michigan follows an approach more akin to the pre-Stewart 
framework in New Jersey. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that 
property owners have no duty to maintain sidewalks; rather, that duty 
falls by statute to the local government. Michigan’s Motor Vehicle 
Code provides: “the duty of the state and the county road commissions 
to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty extends 
only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular 
travel and does not include sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or any 
other installation outside of the improved portion . . . .”
205
 The Michigan 
Supreme Court has construed this limiting language to place the burden 
for maintenance of such pedestrian thoroughfares in the realm of local 
government responsibility.
206
 
D. Connecticut 
Similarly, in Connecticut an abutting property owner is under no 
duty to keep public sidewalks in front of his or her property in a 
reasonably safe condition. Rather, the municipalities have the duty to 
maintain public sidewalks, and, under Connecticut General Statutes 
section 13a-149,
207
 they are liable for damages caused by a breach of that 
 
203 Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 154 (Mass. 2010). 
204 Id. at 151. 
205 M.S.A. § 3.996 (102)(1). 
206 “It appears that the purpose of this limiting sentence, which applies only to counties 
and the state, is to allocate responsibility for sidewalks and crosswalks to local governments, 
including townships, cities, and villages.” Mason v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm’rs, 523 
N.W.2d 791, 794 n.6 (Mich. 1994) (emphasis added). 
207 Section 13a-149 provides, inter alia: 
Any person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge 
may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair. . . . No action 
for any such injury shall be maintained against any town, city, corporation or 
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duty. Although the responsibility to maintain public sidewalks is 
generally the responsibility of the municipalities, Connecticut courts 
recognize exceptions where a statute or ordinance shifts the duty to the 
abutting property owner and where the abutting property owner created 
the unsafe condition.
208
  
Connecticut has enacted legislation specifically 
permitting municipalities to adopt ordinances requiring property owners 
and their tenants to remove snow and ice from sidewalks abutting the 
property and transferring liability for damages associated with snow and 
ice on sidewalks to the property owners or tenants.
209
 In cities and towns 
where such ordinances are enacted, a property owner or tenant can be 
held liable for not sufficiently clearing snow and ice from an abutting 
sidewalk within a reasonable time.
210
 The duty of an abutting property 
owner in those municipalities which have adopted section 7-163a is to 
use reasonable care to keep the sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition 
 
borough, unless written notice of such injury and a general description of the 
same, and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, 
within ninety days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town, 
or to the clerk of such city or borough, or to the secretary or treasurer of such 
corporation. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-149 (West 2009). The word “road” has been construed to include 
sidewalks. Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247, 1250 n.1 (Conn. 2008) (citing 
Hornyak v. Fairfield, 67 A.2d 562, 563 (Conn. 1949)). 
208 Rivers, 950 A.2d at 1250 n.3 (quoting Wilson v. New Haven, 567 A.2d 829, 830 
(Conn. 1989)); Abramczyk v. Abbey, 780 A.2d 957, 960 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001), cert. 
denied, 785 A.2d 229 (Conn. 2001). 
209 Connecticut General Statutes § 7-163a provides, in pertinent part:  
(a) Any [municipality] may, by ordinance, adopt the provisions of this section. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13a-149 or any other general 
statute or special act, such [municipality] shall not be liable to any person 
injured in person or property caused by the presence of ice or snow on a public 
sidewalk unless such municipality is the owner or person in possession and 
control of land abutting such sidewalk . . .  provided such municipality shall be 
liable for its affirmative acts with respect to such sidewalk. 
(c) (1) The owner or person in possession and control of land abutting a public 
sidewalk shall have the same duty of care with respect to the presence of ice or 
snow on such sidewalk toward the portion of the sidewalk abutting his property 
as the municipality had prior to the effective date of any ordinance adopted 
pursuant to the provisions of this section and shall be liable to persons injured in 
person or property where a breach of said duty is the proximate cause of said 
injury. 
210 “In sum, an ordinance adopted in accordance with § 7-163a has a dual function: it 
relieves the municipality of the duty and liability with respect to the removal of snow and 
ice from public sidewalks, and it shifts that duty and liability to the abutting landowner.” 
Rivers, 950 A.2d at 1261. 
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from snow and ice.
211
 
E. Washington 
Washington has always been protective of abutting property 
owners. In Rivett v. Tacoma, the Washington Supreme Court 
invalidated a Tacoma ordinance making property owners who failed to 
notify the City of hazardous sidewalk conditions liable for all amounts 
paid to any person suffering injury on account of the sidewalk defect.
212
 
The Court concluded that the ordinance exceeded Tacoma’s police 
powers and deprived abutting owners of substantive due process.
213
 
Washington courts had held repeatedly that abutting owners have no 
duty to take action, of any kind, with respect to the adjacent sidewalk, 
unless the abutting owner’s use of that sidewalk itself created the hazard 
to passing pedestrians.
214
 Rather it is the abutting owner’s use of the 
property, not use of the sidewalk or mere ownership of abutting 
property, that gives rise to liability.
215
 As in New Jersey pre-Stewart, 
where an abutting owner causes the dangerous condition by a special 
use of the property, such owner is directly liable to the injured person.
216
 
The city is also directly liable to the injured claimant, assuming the city 
was on notice of the defect, but may recover over against the at-fault 
abutting owner, originally under a passive-active theory of primary and 
secondary liability.
217
 The Court in Rivett held that a City has the 
primary duty to maintain public rights of way in a safe condition and 
that the Tacoma ordinance was invalid for purporting “to place that 
primary duty upon the abutting landowner.”
218
 
 
 
211 Id. at 1253 n.8 (quoting Rivers v. City of New Britain, 913 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2007)), (Bishop, J., dissenting), rev’d, 950 A.2d 1247, supra note 201, at 1262. 
212 Rivett v. Tacoma, 870 P.2d 299, 305 (Wash. 1994). 
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., Groves v. Citv of Tacoma, 777 P.2d 566, 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).   
215 James v. Burchett, 129 P.2d 790, 791-92 (Wash. 1942); Groves, 777 P.2d at 568.  
216 James, 129 P.2d at 792 (citing 25 AM. JUR. 657 Highways §§ 364 and 365); Mitchell 
v. Thomas, 8 P.2d 639, 641 (Mont. 1932); Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water User’s Ass’n, 
114 P.2d 904, 905 (Ariz. 1941). 
217 See Turner v. City of Tacoma, 435 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. 1967); City of Cle Elum v. 
Yeaman, 259 P. 35, 36 (Wash. 1927). 
218 Rivett, 870 P.2d at 303. 
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F. South Carolina 
South Carolina also imposes responsibility for the care and 
maintenance of its sidewalks on local governments.
219
 The South 
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Vaughn v. Town of 
Lyman, a case involving an alleged trip and fall on a municipal sidewalk 
that had become broken over time by overgrown tree roots.
220
 The 
plaintiff filed suit against the Town of Lyman.
221
 The Town argued it 
should not be held liable because it “did not own, control, or maintain 
the sidewalk where the injury occurred.”
222
 The plaintiff moved for 
summary judgment, which was granted.
223
 
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that while generally, 
the common law does not impose any duty to act, ”[t]he general rule in 
this country is that municipalities which have full and complete control 
over the streets and highways within their corporate limits are liable in 
damages for injuries sustained in consequence of their failure to use 
reasonable care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for public 
travel.”
224
 Additionally, the Court noted it “has interpreted this duty to 
extend not only to those streets, ways, and bridges owned and 
maintained by the municipality, but also to those under the control of 
the municipality.”
225
  
G. Pennsylvania 
 Pennsylvania has a unique system in which either the abutting 
property owner or the municipality may be held liable for sidewalk 
defects, depending on the circumstances. In Pennsylvania, there are two 
 
219 Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-27-120 (West 1976): 
The city or town council of any city or town of over one thousand inhabitants 
shall keep in good repair all the streets, ways and bridges within the limits of the 
city or town and for such purpose it is invested with all the powers, rights and 
privileges within the limits of such city or town that are given to the governing 
bodies of the several counties of this State as to the public roads. 
220 Vaughan v. Town of Lyman, 635 S.E.2d 631, 633-34 (S.C. 2006). 
221 Id. at 633. 
222 Id.  
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 635 (quoting Terrell v. City of Orangeburg, 180 S.E. 670, 672 (S.C. 
1935)) (emphasis added) overruled by McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 744 (S.C. 
1985) (abrogating sovereign immunity). 
225 Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Camden, 103 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1958)); Terrell, 180 
S.E. at 670. Both parties conceded that under S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-480, the definition of 
street includes the sidewalk. Vaughan, 635 S.E.2d at 635 n.2. 
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general categories of sidewalk cases, each of which has its own rules 
regarding liability. In cases in which the injury was caused by a failure 
to maintain or repair the sidewalk where the defect “was occasioned, or 
knowingly permitted to exist, by either the tenant in sole possession or 
the owner,”
226
 the primary duty is on the property owner or tenant. The 
“[c]ity’s liability to see that the sidewalk is left in repair is secondary.”
227
 
In these cases, if a plaintiff recovers from the city, the city may in turn 
seek indemnification from the property owner who is primarily liable. 
Because the property owner is primarily liable, it cannot seek 
indemnification from the city.
228
 In contrast, where the defect is as a 
result of the construction or design of the sidewalk, and such defect was 
created by the municipality, the municipality is the “active tortfeasor,” 
and it cannot seek indemnification from the property owner.
229
 Where 
the city itself has created a hazardous condition through its contractors 
or architects, the property owner has no duty to eliminate the condition. 
Therefore, there can be no occasion for the property owner to seek 
indemnification or contribution from the municipality.
230
 
 Thus, of the jurisdictions surrounding New Jersey, only the City 
of New York has completely absolved itself of all responsibility, while 
neighbors such as Connecticut and, to a lesser extent, Pennsylvania, 
continue to insulate property owners from liability, placing the burden 
of sidewalk maintenance on public entities. Of the states farther away 
from New Jersey, Massachusetts is the only other jurisdiction that has 
extended the duty of care to abutting property owners, while Michigan, 
Washington and South Carolina all respect the traditional common law 
rule of no duty to act absent affirmative conduct. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The question of sidewalk ownership and liability underscores the 
fundamentally ambiguous state into which sidewalks have fallen in New 
Jersey. Originally, sidewalks were considered to be essential 
components of public roadways in urban areas. Indeed, one reason that 
villages and towns sought to incorporate as boroughs or cities was to 
obtain the legal power to improve the streets and lay sidewalks. 
 
226 Golden v. City of Philadelphia, 57 A.2d 429, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948). 
227 Psichos v. Sauvion, 520 A.2d 945, 946 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987). 
228 Golden, 57 A.2d at 430.    
229 Id.    
230 Psichos, 520 A.2d at 946. 
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Recognizing that municipalities are no longer willing to maintain and 
repair sidewalks and that the Legislature has not seen fit to clear up the 
ambiguity or allocate responsibility, the courts in New Jersey have 
chosen to place the burden of liability, and hence sidewalk repairs, on 
abutting commercial property owners – and property owners the courts 
deem commercial in nature. 
The rationale for imposing a duty to inspect and maintain adjoining 
sidewalks on owners of commercial property as opposed to residential, 
public, charitable/religious and mixed use property cannot withstand 
scrutiny. Sidewalks benefit all abutting property owners and the public 
in general, and to suggest commercial owners receive a greater benefit 
is an unjustifiable assumption. The “pass through of costs” theory, 
frequently used as a rationale in products liability cases, leads to 
inconsistent and unpredictable results when applied to New Jersey’s 
sidewalk liability law.
231
 
 The Stewart approach and rule of law, based upon an artificial and 
contrived rationale, was bound to yield confusing and untoward results. 
Post-Stewart case law bears this out. To begin with, given the rationale 
of the Stewart decision, the “abutting commercial landowner” exception 
to New Jersey’s “no sidewalk liability rule” has been carefully and 
consistently limited by the New Jersey courts, even as to abutting 
commercial owners.
232
 For instance, the Stewart rule was not applied 
when a pedestrian tripped on a curb in front of the defendant’s 
apartment building.
233
 The curb was separated from the sidewalk itself 
by a strip of grass.
234
 Notwithstanding the benefit to the abutting 
property owner in having a safe curb over which pedestrians may 
traverse, the court held the abutting commercial property owner owed 
no duty.
235
 The exception was also not applied when a shopping center 
 
231 Justice Clifford noted as much in Davis, stating “[b]ut why should a business 
operator have imposed on him a legal duty which an abutting residential owner or operator 
escapes under circumstances precisely the same from the point of view of the injured 
pedestrian, a stranger to both of them?’” Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 57 (N.J. 1975) 
(Clifford, J., dissenting). 
232 See Levin v. Devoe, 533 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); MacGrath 
v. Levin Prop., 606 A.2d 1108, 1109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). 
233 Levin, 533 A.2d at 979. 
234 Id. at 977. 
235 Id. at 979. Courts have declined to categorically extend Stewart’s rule of liability to 
curbs, generally reasoning that a curb is more a feature of the road and is, therefore, “a 
significantly less immediate means of pedestrian ingress and egress to the abutting property 
than is a sidewalk.” Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 734 A.2d 762, 772 (N.J. 1999). Thus, 
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patron was injured while crossing the public highway adjoining the 
defendant’s shopping center, again notwithstanding the benefit to the 
abutting commercial property owner in having a public highway 
adjacent to its premises.
236
 Finally, the exception was not applied when a 
pedestrian fell on snow accumulated on a sidewalk abutting a vacant lot 
zoned for commercial use on the theory that the owner of a vacant lot 
derives no benefit from pedestrian traffic on the adjacent sidewalk.
237
 In 
refusing to apply the Stewart exception to commercial property owners 
under the above circumstances, courts have stressed that, under New 
Jersey law, the existence or non-existence of a tort duty is “ultimately a 
question of fairness.”
238
 Fairness, of course – like beauty – is in the eye 
of the beholder. Therefore, it should be no surprise that imposing a tort 
duty on a commercial property owner to inspect and maintain property 
it does not own or control may certainly be viewed as unfair by those 
burdened, especially when non-commercial owners who also benefit 
from an adjacent sidewalk are not so burdened.
239
 
 
because the primary functions of the curb in Levin were to “channel surface water from the 
road into storm drains and to serve as a barrier for cars to park against,” the court refused to 
hold a commercial property owner liable for injuries suffered when a pedestrian tripped and 
fell on a curb in front of an apartment building as she was attempting to cross the street. 
Levin, 533 A.2d at 979. The court recognized, however, that in some cases curbs might be 
“structurally an integral part of . . . sidewalks” for which the abutting property owner may 
be liable. Id. Confusing the issue even more, the New Jersey Supreme Court has determined 
that in many cases a fact sensitive inquiry is required. See Norris, 734 A.2d at 771 
(“whether a curb is deemed part of a sidewalk . . . might well depend on the context and 
facts in the given case.”). See also MacGrath, 606 A.2d at 1109. 
236 MacGrath, 606 A.2d at 1109. 
237 Abraham v. Gupta, 656 A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
238 See MacGrath, 606 A.2d at 1109, and Levin, 533 A.2d at 979 (quoting Goldberg v. 
Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962)). See also Stewart v. 104 Wallace 
St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 889 (N.J. 1981) (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“notions of fairness 
weigh heavily” in deciding whether to hold property owners responsible for injury to 
pedestrians). 
239 Justice Clifford  addressed these principles in his dissenting opinion in Davis, 
dealing with a commercial owner’s obligation to remove ice and snow where he observed: 
As for the ‘fairness and equity’ of the situation my notion of it does not lead me 
to discover a hitherto unrecognized obligation to remove whatever snow and ice 
impediment may be said to have existed in the public way. Apparently the 
critical factor in the majority’s consideration is the commercial nature of 
defendant’s activities. And so if plaintiff had fallen where passing pedestrians 
had packed down the snow, there would be no duty to correct the condition. 
With respect to, say, a retail store, I suppose under the majority’s theory a fall at 
a spot in the public sidewalk where customers making toward the store had 
created a slippery condition in the public way could give rise to liability; 
whereas if the mishap occurred at a snowy place trampled down and made 
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There have always been circumstances where fairness dictates 
imposing a duty on an abutting owner to inspect and maintain the 
adjacent sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. These cases have, 
however, always involved affirmative conduct of the property owner. 
For instance, sixty years ago, in Saco v. Hall,
240
 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court noted that an abutting property owner is liable for “an ‘invasion 
of the public easement for the owners benefit by the erection and use of 
devices located over and above the sidewalk’ that create ‘a dangerous 
condition in the public easement.’”
241
 There, the Court held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover for injuries sustained as a result of 
falling on an icy sidewalk in front of the defendant’s property because 
the frozen water had flowed from a deteriorated leader on the 
defendant’s building across the public sidewalk, where it created a 
dangerous condition.
242
 The Court held the property owner responsible 
for creating a hazardous sidewalk condition in the course of his use of 
the abutting property because he invaded and made use of the public 
easement for his own exclusive benefit.
243
 The erection and use of 
devices located over and above the sidewalk became the proximate 
cause of plaintiff’s injury, creating a dangerous impediment in the free 
and safe use of the sidewalk by the public.
244
 
Other cases have similarly imposed a duty on an abutting property 
owner when the property owner was responsible for the creation of a 
dangerous condition within the public right-of-way. In Narsh v. Zirbser 
Brothers, Inc.,
245
 for instance, the court stated that “[t]he rule is well 
settled in this State that one who places or maintains in or near a 
highway anything which, if neglected, will render the way unsafe for 
travel, is bound to exercise due care to prevent it from becoming 
dangerous.”
246
 Likewise, in Pirozzi, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
 
hazardous by disinterested pedestrians, there would be no obligation to correct 
the condition. Such examples, limited only by one’s imagination, emphasize 
that the principle announced by the majority is neither equitable nor susceptible 
of judicial administration.  
Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 56 (N.J. 1975) (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
240 Saco v. Hall, 63 A.2d 887, 890 (N.J. 1949). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 888. 
243 Id. at 889-90. 
244 Id. at 890. 
245 Narsh v. Zirbser Bros., Inc., 268 A.2d 46, 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (citing 
Weller v. McCormick, 52 N.J.L. 470 (1890)). 
246 See also Sims v. City of Newark, 581 A.2d 524, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
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stated that a property owner is entitled to use the sidewalk in front of his 
premises, only on the condition that such use does not unreasonably 
interfere with the safety of the highway for public travel.
247
 The Court 
reasoned that “the public duty to exercise reasonable care . . . exists for 
the benefit of individual travelers, and hence, when an individual 
sustains peculiar personal injury as the result of such negligence, a 
private action accrues to him against the person in default.”
248
 
As can be observed, prior to Stewart, it was settled law that 
commercial and non-commercial property owners were held responsible 
for injuries resulting from their affirmative acts that caused or 
contributed to an unsafe condition on an abutting sidewalk. Stewart 
expanded that liability by imposing an affirmative duty on an owner of 
commercial property abutting a sidewalk to inspect the sidewalk and 
maintain it in a reasonably safe condition without regard to affirmative 
conduct creating or contributing to the unsafe condition.
249
 
Nevertheless, residential, charitable/religious and public property 
owners have no such affirmative duty to inspect and maintain abutting 
sidewalks. As previously demonstrated, imposition of duties owed to 
the public traversing an abutting sidewalk by these property owners 
varies widely. Such property owners do not currently have an obligation 
to inspect the sidewalk and alleviate dangerous conditions not of their 
making akin to the duty Stewart imposes on owners of commercial 
property. The Court has long had an opportunity to come up with a 
principled, consistent approach. As a result of the Court’s failure to do 
so, however, the New Jersey Legislature should return the state of the 
law to the pre-Stewart era by crafting a fair, uniform and predictable 
standard with regard to liability for defects on sidewalks. The new 
standard should be easy for the residents of New Jersey to understand 
and the courts of New Jersey to apply consistently. Potential plaintiffs 
injured on sidewalks would also clearly understand their burden of 
proof: in any sidewalk liability case, it must be shown that the property 
owner created or contributed to the defect, no matter what type of 
property owner the defendant may be. A suggested bill has been 
 
1990); Deberjeois v. Schneider, 604 A.2d 210, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). 
247 Pirozzi v. Acme Holding Co. of Paterson, 74 A.2d 297, 301-02 (1950). 
248 Id.  
249 See also Brown v. Saint Venantius Sch., 544 A.2d 842, 843 (N.J. 1988); Dupree v. 
City of Clifton, 798 A.2d 105, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Nielsen v. Lee, 810 
A.2d 600, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Learn v. City of Perth Amboy, 586 A.2d 
327, 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).   
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included as Appendix A. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned the common 
law general rule of no liability for unsafe abutting sidewalks as to 
commercial owners. Thus, Stewart imposed an obligation on behalf of 
owners of commercial property abutting sidewalks to maintain the 
sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition but otherwise left alone existing 
law as to residential, charitable/religious and public property owners. 
The rationale in treating commercial property owners differently than 
others was the perceived fairness of imposing a duty to inspect for and 
correct unsafe conditions in light of the benefit commercial property 
owners derive from pedestrians using the sidewalk. However, non-
commercial property owners may benefit from pedestrians using the 
sidewalk and some commercial property owners may not benefit from 
pedestrian traffic. As a result, the fundamental rationale for the Stewart 
rule must be reexamined. 
In the interest of fairness, uniformity and predictability, the law 
pertaining to sidewalk liability should be altered to impose a duty only 
when the affirmative conduct of an adjoining property owner, without 
regard to status, causes or contributes to an unsafe condition on the 
abutting sidewalk. All property owners, no matter what type, would be 
able to understand their duty and assess their liability. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated in Stewart that “[a]s for the determination of 
which properties will be covered by the rule we adopt today, commonly 
accepted definitions of ‘commercial’ and ‘residential’ property should 
apply, with difficult cases to be decided as they arise.”
250
 Yet difficult 
cases have become the rule and not the exception as the Court 
envisioned. Even so, the New Jersey Supreme Court continues to abide 
by the confusion engendered by Stewart, lauding in Luchejko the 
“clarity of the residential/commercial dichotomy” as opposed to an 
“unpredictable case-by-case balancing test that would be extremely 
difficult to fairly and consistently administer and that would lead to 
tremendous uncertainty.”
251
 Accordingly, the New Jersey Legislature 
must act. This change in the law would eliminate the artificial 
distinctions between property owners based on use of the property and 
 
250 Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 889 (N.J. 1981). 
251 Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 23 A.3d 912, 924 (N.J. 2011) (emphasis added). 
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would reinstate the no duty rule. Fairness, uniformity and predictability 
compel such a change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BURKE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2012  1:58 PM 
2012 NEW JERSEY SIDEWALK LIABILITY 269 
VIII.  APPENDIX A 
1 AN ACT concerning liability for defects on public sidewalks 
2 in New Jersey. 
3 BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the 
State 
4 of New Jersey. 
5 
6 The Act shall read as follows: 
7 
8 There shall be no duty to maintain or make repairs to a 
9 public sidewalk absent affirmative conduct of an adjoining 
10 property owner. The status of the adjoining property owner, 
11 be it commercial, residential, public, religious/charitable or 
12 mixed use, will not be considered purposes of assessing liability. 
13 The burden lies with the injured to prove that an abutting 
14 property owner caused or contributed to the unsafe condition(s) 
15 on the abutting sidewalk(s) that caused the injury. 
16 
17STATEMENT 
18 
19 This bill is intended to clarify confusion regarding liability 
20 for defects to public sidewalks in light of the New Jersey 
21 Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, 
22 Inc., 432 A.2d 881 (1981). 
23 
24The New Jersey Supreme Court in Stewart abrogated 
25 the longstanding common law rule of no liability absent 
26 affirmative conduct for a rule that holds property owners 
27 deemed to own commercial property liable for defects on 
28 abutting property. The lower courts, in attempting to apply 
29 Stewart, have had difficulty assessing what should be 
30 considered commercial for purposes of assessing property 
31 owner liability. The result has been injustice for both property 
32 owners, who have not been given notice that repairs must be 
33 made to adjoining sidewalks, and the injured, whose chances 
34 of being made whole are dependent largely upon which spot 
35 on the sidewalk the injury occurred. In the interest of fairness, 
36 uniformity and predictability, this bill will reintroduce the 
37 common law standard of no liability absent affirmative 
38 conduct, regardless how the adjoining property is classified. 
 
